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When we look at an ordinary textbook of history of psy-
chology, we read that the history of the discipline begins 
in the 19th century, usually with Wundt – sometimes with 
Fechner, seldom with Herbar; and that before that there was 
the long philosophical past, Bacon, Descartes, and Locke. 
Sometimes we find some mention of the Greek philosophy, 
but between Aristotle and the philosophers of the 16th cen-
tury we have only the dark.
In my opinion, things are different. Beginning with the 
last quarter of the 16th century, psychology defines itself as 
a distinct field of scientific knowledge, as a branch of the 
physics, apt to study not only the lower parts of the soul 
(vegetative and sensitive), but also the higher ones (intellec-
tive soul), reserved in the scholastic tradition to metaphys-
ics.
This happened in a specific field of the philosophical 
inquiry, the Ramism, with Freigius (1575). He printed the 
word psychologia as the label of this new domain of knowl-
edge for the first time. (The work of the very first creator 
of the term psychologia, the Dalmatian Marcus Marulus, 
was lost, and we don’t know anything about it.) Freigius’ 
enterprise was successful mainly in medicine, but was al-
most completely ignored in philosophy by the above men-
tioned great scholars of the inquiry upon mind and soul, 
and arrived along a parallel path to the 18th century, when 
Christian Wolff (1732), with his Psychologia empirica, es-
tablished the basis of the scientific psychology. The aim of 
this paper is to cast some light on this path which was until 
know almost completely ignored by the historians of our 
discipline.
The origins
As its etymology suggests, psychology was born as the 
science of the soul. It is hard to know, however, what the 
Split humanist Marko Marulić (Marcus Marulus: 1450-
1524) had in mind when he coined the term psichiologia 
around 1520 (or maybe some years earlier), because only 
the title of his work, Psichiologia de ratione animae Hu-
manae, has reached our days (Krstić, 1964). A short biog-
raphy of Marulić, with a list of his works, was written by 
his contemporary Franjo Božičević (Franciscus Natalis), 
and was published posthumously by Daniel Farlatus (1765, 
pp. 335-337), and more recently by M. Marcovich (see 
Natalis, 1957). In his list, Natalis called Marulus’s treatise 
Psychologia, and specified that this was a liber primus. As 
Brožek (1999) noted, the term, probably of Byzantine ori-
gin, appears in different variations in the available lists of 
Marulić’s works, including Psychologia and Ethologia, but 
the oldest versions show that psichiologia is most likely the 
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variant that Marulić used. Some 30-40 years ago, several 
psychology historians engaged in a debate on the real mean-
ing of Marulus’s psichiologia and about his role in the de-
velopment of this discipline (Brožek, 1973; Diamond, 1984; 
Lapointe, 1970, 1972; Massimi, 1983; Vande Kemp, 1980). 
In particular, Massimi hypothesized that by ratio Marulus 
intended a sort of mental hygiene, and Diamond insisted 
that the proper meaning of ratio was nature, as referred to 
in Alcuin (and we can add, in Aquinas and in Buridan). 
However, resolving that Marulus’ work was a treatise 
on the nature of the soul isn’t saying much. The 16th cen-
tury was full of very important treatises on the soul, e.g., 
the works of Melanchthon (Melant, 1558) and Vives (Viuis, 
1538). What was the opinion of Marulus about the most im-
portant issues at play? About the methods to study the soul? 
About its partitions? What was his position among Aristo-
telianism and Galenism? All this is unknown (ignoramus 
et ignorabimus) and played no role in the history of ideas. 
Indeed, more than two centuries had to elapse after Marulus 
for the term psychology to begin to take on the meaning at-
tributed to it today in science and philosophy. 
It was only in 1732 that the Leibnizian philosopher 
Christian Wolff published his Psychologia empirica, an es-
say that is generally considered to be the starting point for 
understanding the discipline in its modern sense. Before 
Wolff, however, the term Psychologia was used several 
times in written texts. It could be said the term was rein-
vented, because it appeared for the first time in 1575 and 
was used several times in the following years, always in a 
specific area, that of the Ramist philosophers in Germany 
(cf. Freedman, 1993; and, for a recent list of references, see 
P. Sharratt, 2000). They were called so because they were 
followers of the humanist Petrus Ramus (Pierre de la Ra-
mée), an opponent of scholastic Aristotelianism, and a critic 
of Aristotle himself (he was named Aristotelomastix, the 
Aristotle’s whip), killed during the massacre of St. Bartho-
lomew at the hands of an assassin. It was in this milieu that 
this domain of knowledge was born. In this respect, it is 
interesting to note that R. Goclenius, one of the first users of 
the term psychologia, left it in his Lexicon after his desertion 
from Ramism, and his return to Aristotle (Goclenius, 1613; 
Mengal, 2000).
The Ramists were characterised by their attention to 
education, their focus on studium humanitatis, with an ex-
plicit commitment to civic and political life, away from the 
ivory towers of the Scholastics and the Aristotelians. One 
of the most articulate responses to Ramism was that of the 
Paduan Aristotelian Jacobus Zabarella, which will be briefly 
discussed below. Zabarella did not condemn Ramism in full 
and a priori, but tried to incorporate its more valid com-
ponents in his system, while making a clear distinction be-
tween teaching and research methods, which even earned 
him the appreciation of his opponents (for instance, Zab-
arella, 1578, see Mikkeli, 1992). He is mainly remembered 
as one of the most acute commentators of Aristotle’s De 
Anima, and a touchstone by which to compare Ramism. 
The historians of ideas divide the Ramists into pure 
Ramists, such as Freigius and Snellius; semi-Ramists, such 
as Goclenius and Casmann; and Philippe-Ramists, such as 
Melanchthon. Since these philosophers are the very early 
adopters of the term psychology, an indigenous origin of the 
expression can be argued, different from the Byzantine one 
of the Dalmatian Marulus - and there is reason to believe 
that the creation of the term should be credited to Petrus 
Ramus, or at least to someone in the small circle of schol-
ars closest to him. For a long time Melanchthon (1558) was 
believed to have been the inventor of the term, and to have 
given this title to a lecture or lesson. This assumption no 
longer enjoys any credit, since there is no trace of such a 
conference. This erroneous attribution was made by Volk-
mann (1884) and was then endorsed and widely promoted 
by Eucken (1879).
Apparently, however, the first printed appearance of the 
term was made by Joannes Thomas Freigius (Johan Thomas 
Freig), who used it for the first time in 1575, in the “Cata-
logus locum communium”, prefixed to his Ciceronianus, 
in the sixth division (“Arts”, the first of which is “Philos-
ophy”), locus 12, including the subdivisions of “Physics” 
(Meteorology with “Metallica”, “Historia plantarum et ani-
malium”, “Medicine”). Sir William Hamilton (1859, p. 96 
ff.) had already reported this attribution. Hamilton found 
Freigius’s quotation in Ars sciendi, attributed to Theophilus 
Gale, although Thomas Gowan was its real author (1681). 
Freigius possibly ignored Marulus’ work, which is never 
quoted in the Ramist texts. And it is quite possible that he 
reinvented anew the word psychologia. Remember that in 
this period many neologisms were created, often with the 
root psyché: psychogonia, psychomachia, psychopedia, psy-
chopannichia, and so on (see Vidal, 2011, p. 26 ff.). 
A year later, Freigius (1576) once again put the psycho-
logia among the philosophy divisions (in fact, knowledge), 
as outlined in Figure 1. It should be noted that even here, ac-
cording to Freigius, psychology is not a part of metaphysics, 
as many scholars would think, but of physics, according to a 
more modern interpretation. Notice that until Freigius only 
the lower parts of the soul (vegetative and sensitive) were 
considered possible subject matters of the physics, while the 
intellective part had to be studied exclusively by metaphys-
ics. This was so in the Aristotelian tradition from Aquinas 
and Buridan on (cf. Aquinas, 2000; Sobol, 1984).
Demonstration that all of the soul can be a subject matter 
of the physics can be found in the treatise on physics which 
Freigius wrote in 1579. Of the 36 books that make it up, 
the 27th is precisely called De psychologia (pp. 761-771). 
Here the reader is faced with an actual scientific treatise on 
the soul, primarily defined as “nihil aliud principium vitae 
quam in corpore natural”. There are three “differences” in 
the living, the natural, the sentient, and the intelligent, and 
three species of soul, which take the name of the differenc-
es. It is not clear whether they are different souls or three 
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“natures” of the same soul. However, Freigius shows the 
subject, location, and organs of each of these functions.
Thus, in the natural soul (vegetative - pp. 761-765), 
which is “first of all”, there is a triple faculty: procreative, 
nursing, and enhancer (Auctrix). There are three functions, 
namely Reproduction, Nutrition, and Growth. As regards 
the objects, “Reproductive work is to rise the seed of the 
species.... Nutritional whole matter is in the food, to whom 
is directed in depth, and to the substance of the body into 
which is turned.... Accretion...works...around the solid parts 
of the body1”. As far as the organ is concerned, the instru-
ment of the soul is the natural body in its entirety. Finally, 
the liver is the site in animals, and its veins are the channels 
and ducts.
The sentient soul (pp. 765-768), “which presides to the 
animals”, has faculties with a dual “power, one for knowl-
edge, the other for movement”. The first is either external 
or internal, and in it there is the ability to see, hear, and so 
on. In the latter there is the “power to discriminate, to fixate 
and to save” and it also dual, both internal and external; “in 
it there is the power to desire and to live“. This soul, then, 
has two functions, “cognition or apprehension and motion”. 
The first function pertains to the external and internal sens-
es. In the case of the first, colours and sounds are perceived 
through the air by earthly animals which “walk or crawl, 
but also aquatic ones”. However, there are senses such as 
taste and touch that require direct contact2. “Inner senses 
are Discretion, Fiction and Memory. Discretion distinguish-
es between simple indivisible images. Fiction...is directed 
towards such images, ...from them produces new forms...
Memory, excited by the senses, embraces and contains 
them”3. With regard to the other power, Motus, it is also 
either internal or external. If it is internal, it is Animal or 
Vital: “The Animal (in Greek ὀρμή or desire) is a movement 
Figure 1. Instruments and parts of philosophy according to Freigius (1576).
1 Procreationis opus est stirps surgens semine.... Nutritionis materia tota 
est in alimento, in quam penitus incumbit & in corporis substantiam 
convertit…. Accretio…negotiatur…circa corporis partes solidas.
2 “qui non nisi sibi coniuncta sentiunt”.
3 Interiore sensus sunt Discretio, Fictio, Memoria. Discretio…simplicia 
et individua simulachra discernit. Fictio…simulachra illa obvertit:…
ex illis quoque novas formas effingit…Memoria, suscepta e sensibus 
simulachra amplectitur et continet
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and an interior activity, which it is required that is good and 
useful”4. Appetite is threefold, “Natural, Sensitive, Ration-
al...and the vital movement corresponds to the inspiration 
and the expiration of the heart”5. External motion consists 
of walking, swimming, crawling, and flying. The object is 
made up of “the external things, that are around us”, but 
also of “images (fantάsmata) imprinted and permanent in 
the brain to the memory”, or objects of greed, and so on and 
so forth. As far as organs are concerned, these are the sense 
organs, except for the sense of touch, which relies on the 
entire body. The brain is the site, where sensory informa-
tion arrives through the relevant channels, the nerves and 
the arteries. Thus “the vital spirits from the hearth through 
the carotides are sent to the cerebral ventricles”. 
Finally, there is the intelligent soul (pp. 769-772). Its fac-
ulties are given by the “power of 1. Receiving... 2. Acting... 
3. Composing... 4. Judging... 5. Thinking... 6. Contemplat-
ing... 8. Working”6. The functions are “1. Apprehension... 2. 
Composition... 3. Estimation... 4. Reasoning... 5. Contem-
plation... 6. Consultation, prudence, will”7. The subjects of 
the intelligent soul “are the images...that are saved by the 
senses, as understandable and good or bad”. The intelligent 
soul does not have an organ.
This discussion is hardly original. There is a clear influ-
ence of the Platonic tripartition and a careful reading of Ar-
istotle. In Freigius, contrary to what is the case in Casmann 
(1594), there is not even an attempt to discuss the views 
debated at the time between Ramists and anti-Ramists. The 
importance of the work lies somewhere else, namely in the 
clear goal to place psychology among the natural sciences. 
It is fair to stress that this was not the vision that Ramus 
had of physics. Ramus was a great supporter of the teach-
ing of physics, together with the other “quadrivium” arts 
(arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy), that had fallen into 
neglect. Nevertheless, in his view, in physics there was no 
room for psychology or whichever name could be given to 
this branch of knowledge (see Ramus, 1565).
The diffusion of the term
Thus, the term psychology began to circulate. In 1582 
Noël Taillepied, a Franciscan monk (and a fierce opponent of 
Ramism), used it as the title of an incredible hodgepodge on 
the apparitions of spirits, which, even if taking into account 
the fact that the thoughts about the comet by Pierre Bayle 
would have to wait exactly a century, must be considered 
completely inadequate. Taillepied understood “psychology” 
as the science of spirits like ghosts, which had nothing to do 
with the subsequent development of this discipline. 
In 1590 the work by Rudolf Göckel (Rodolphus Gocle-
nius) appeared, still indicated by different texts as the source 
of the term psychology. This work is actually a collection of 
different contributions (Goclenius is the editor), all unified 
under the title Psychology, significantly in Greek despite the 
text being in Latin. The 12 contributors are distinguished 
theologians, philosophers, and physicians, including Goc-
lenius himself (pp. 299-302). Except for the long chapter 
of the Marburger lawyer Hermannus Vultejus (pp. 1-47), 
which mainly discusses the concept of the soul in Plato’s 
Timaeus, the contributions are all theological, with particu-
lar attention to the problem of the origin of the soul, and of 
little interest, therefore, for subsequent developments in the 
domain.
In 1597, Goclenius published a new edition of this book, 
with added contributions by Johannes Jacobus Colerus (Jo-
hann Jacob Koller); the posthumous ones by Julius Cae-
sar Scaliger (Julius Bordon, pp. 164-165), an Aristotelian 
suspected of heresy, who, as opposed to Melanchthon, had 
strongly supported the Aristotelian concept of entelechy; 
and by Girolamo Savonarola (pp. 166-168), who almost ex-
actly a century earlier (1498) had been “hanged and burned 
alive” in Piazza della Signoria in Florence (ferrarensis 
monachus ornatus martyrdom, as Goclenius presents him). 
All three contributions deny that the soul comes from the 
seed, but claim its origin directly from God.
A year later, two works appeared, hitherto neglected by 
historians of the discipline, which included the word psy-
chology in their titles. The first is of a medical doctor, Johann 
Ludwig Havenreuter (Johannes Ludovicus Havvenreute-
rius, 1591), who had already contributed to Goclenius’s text 
(1590, pp. 293-298), including a comment on Aristotle’s De 
Anima and a broad debate on possible medical applications. 
With regard to the second, by Melchior Laubanus (1591), 
then rector of Brig, unfortunately the author of this article 
could only see the title, Psychologia thesibus (?), probably 
mutilated. However, given Laubanus’s production, mainly 
of homiletics, as well as poetry, it is easy to imagine that 
they were religious theses, in the spirit of Disputationes (see 
below).
In 1594 and 1596 these were followed by the work in 
two volumes by Otto Casmann, Goclenius’s pupil, who was 
perhaps better known for the diffusion of the word anthro-
pology (actually invented in 1501 by Magnus Hundt). For 
Casmann, anthropology is the “doctrina humanæ naturæ” 
(Casmann, 1590, p. 1). Man is said to be a “μιχρόκοσμος“ 
(“microcosmos”), a being composed of spirit, the logical 
and perpetual soul, and an organic body, hypostatically 
united. 
4 Animalis (Græcis ὀρμή seu appetitio) est motus et interior agitatio, qua 
quod bonum et utile est quæritur
5 Naturalis, Sentiens, Rationalis…Vitalis motus est cum in cordis inspi-
ratione & expiratione.
6 vis I. Accipiendi…II. Agendi…III. Componendi…IV. Iudicandi…V. 
Ratiocinatrix…VI. Contemplandi…VIII. Pactica seu agens“. 
7 “1. Appræhensio…2. Compositio…3. Existimatio…4. Ratiocina-
tio…5. Contemplatio…6. Consultatio, prudentia, voluntas…7. Me-
moria & recordatio
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Anthropology is divided into psychologia and somatoto-
mia, the first dealing with the soul, the second with the body. 
The text of 1594 almost exclusively concerns psychology. 
The first chapter discusses the controversy over the shape 
of man (pp. 2-21). The second, “De anima hominis”, states 
that “Psychologia est prior pars Anthropologie, quæ docet 
naturam humani spiritus seu animæ logicæ per eiusdem fac-
ultates” (p. 22). Then, the third chapter addresses the issue 
of human faculties (pp. 61-88). These introductory chapters 
are essentially metaphysical and theological discussions - 
Casmann takes sides with Melanton in the dispute that op-
posed him to Scaliger (“Aristotelis inflammatus Love” - p. 
60), one of the authors whom Goclenius included in the 
second volume of his Ψυχολογια (Psychology), as men-
tioned above. Nevertheless, the polemic against Scaliger, 
and generally against an exasperated Aristotelianism, will 
often recur in the volume (other terms of reference were the 
Spanish doctor Franciscus Vallesius, but especially the al-
ready mentioned James Zabarella - it should also be noted 
that Zabarella’s comments on Aristotle’s De Anima were 
published posthumously after the publication of Casmann’s 
book: Zabarella, 1605).
It is from the fourth chapter on that the actual “scien-
tific” discussion of the soul begins. The discussion dwells 
on the logic faculties of the simple (Casmann, 1594, p. 88 
ff.) and compound intellect (p. 109 ff.), the will (p. 129 ff.), 
the language (“facultas sermocinatrix” (p. 140 ff.), the nurs-
ing faculty (hunger and thirst, p. 219 ff.), the enhancer (p. 
267 ff.), appetitive and retentive faculties (p. 281 ff), the 
sense in general (p . 287 ff.), and finally the special senses 
(touch, p. 311 ff., taste, p. 320 ff., smell, p. 353 ff., the two 
“nobler” senses view, p. 325 ff., and hearing, p. 345 ff., the 
common – internal - sense, p. 359 ff.), fantasy (“vis & im-
aginatrix fantastic,” p. 371 ff.), memory (p. 373 ff.), appetite 
(which is “vis movendi”) and its consequences (p. 403 ff.), 
the affections and their consequences (p. 411 ff.), the motion 
of the body (“locomotiva & progressio”, p. 422-423), and 
sleep (and insomnia, p. 423 ff.). There are also long pas-
sages related to issues of mainly physiological (and patho-
physiological) order, such as generation and conception, the 
formation of the foetus, birth, digestion, respiration, and 
the pulse (“micatio”). Due its systematisation, the care with 
which Casmann verifies and discusses the sources of litera-
ture, its effort to anchor the operations of this discipline, 
Casmann’s text, which is far from being original, should 
really be considered the founding text of scientific psychol-
ogy, although it is published well before the revolution that 
would follow in the next century, the spirit of which would 
be caught by Christian Wolff (1732). 
In 1596, the work of another Ramist, Rudolphus Snel-
lius (Rudolf Snel, 1596b) was published, with a preface by 
Goclenius, which would exercise an enormous influence 
within the Ramist field. Here psychology is, according to 
the combined system of Snellius and Ramus, one of the 
eight parts into which philosophy is divided. In the same 
year, Snellius published a critical essay on Melanchthon’s 
De Anima, stating that, “librum de Anima esse partem psy-
chologiæ, quæ est de corporibus animatis sive viventibus, 
quæ pars Physicæ, est postrema. Ubi enim Physicam dis-
tribuerit in Physicam corporum simplicium & composito-
rum, illam in Astrologiam & Physiologiam, hanc autem 
in Meteorologiam & Psychologiam, invenies hunc librum 
ultimam esse Psychologiæ partem […] agit enim psycho-
logia de corporibus animatis, stirpibus scilicet animalibus, 
illæ tantum vivunt, hæc etiam sentunt” (Snellius, 1596a, pp. 
3-4). Melanchthon’s book (Melant, 1558) was published 
about forty years earlier. This is a strong philosophical 
treatise, which begins with a discussion of Plato’s tripartite 
soul and Aristotle’s concept of entelechy. In Snellius’s book 
(1596a), however, except for the beginning, there is no trace 
of the word psychology. Unlike Melanchthon and like many 
Ramists, Snellius felt the need to systematize knowledge in 
its various branches, and to assign a defined role to psychol-
ogy in this systematisation.
A considerable number of contributions were made to 
this point from then on. In 1600 the Leipzig physicist M. 
Fabianus Hippius (Fabian Hippe) under the title Psycholo-
gia Physica expounded the Aristotelian theory, with possible 
applications to medicine, as Havenreuter (1591) had done 
before. In 1606 a young Genoese, Fortunio Liceto (Licetus), 
published his Psychologia anthropine, which is basically a 
new German edition of a text previously published in Genoa, 
with the addition of the term psychologia in the title. Liceto, 
pioneer of embryology, but keen on the fantastic and mon-
strous (his most famous work is De Monstris, 1665), pre-
sented here hypotheses on the origin of the human soul, e.g., 
if at conception it may be derived from parents, and so on.
Under the title psychology, many Disputationes, which 
would be published throughout the seventeenth century, be-
gan to appear. Among the earliest, there is the one edited 
by the Rector of Szczecin and professor in Lübeck Butelius 
Christophorus (Christoph Butel, 1603), who had already 
been mentioned in many other disputationes (the famous 
one with Cardanus, 1600, on the soul of man in relation to 
animals).
In the seventeenth century, the term spread, although it 
would be almost totally ignored by philosophers that today 
are regarded as the most important for the study of men-
tal processes, from Descartes to Malebranche and Hobbes 
and up to Locke. Obviously a complete list of all the con-
tributions that explicitly use the term psychology as a label 
to mark the studies of the soul cannot be provided here. In 
1611, Draudius was able to give the first list of references on 
this term. But it is interesting to note that the general trea-
tises of philosophy, dealing with psychological issues faced 
by ancient authors, from Aristotle to Cicero, increasingly 
employed the term psychology (e.g., Hornius, 1655).
Attempts have also been made to create pseudo-etymol-
ogies or neologisms. Perhaps the most successful can be 
ascribed to the semi-Ramist Johann Heinrich Alsted (1630, 
T. II, L. 13, § 5), who, in pneumatology or the science of 
the mind, distinguished the psychologia (science of the soul 
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as separate from the body) from the empsychologia (joint 
physical science of the soul and the body). Alsted derived 
the term empsychologia (which enjoyed a short but very 
successful life) from the adjective εμψυχος, meaning “that 
has a soul”, which Aristotle (De anima, 413 a21) opposed 
to αψυχος, “inanimate”. The empsychologia is therefore a 
physical science, alongside the study of minerals (mictolo-
gia), plants (phytologia), and animals (therologia).
In the seventeenth century and until the appearance of 
Wolff’s text (see below) the term psychological mainly ap-
pears in two areas: on the one hand, the philosophical and 
theological disputationes, and on the other, medicine. Re-
garding the former, due to their representativeness, only 
three examples will be given here. The first is an essay by 
Johann von Angelius Werdenhagen (1632), philosopher, 
politician, and prolific polygraph, on the doctrine of the 
great mystic Jacob Boehme, that von Werdenhagen sup-
ported, attracting many criticisms from the traditionalist 
circles. In fact, the term psychology, to be understood in the 
theological sense and literally as science of the soul, appears 
here only in the title, and once again, significantly, in Greek.
The second example appeared around the middle of the 
century, with the spiritualist Ralph Cudworth (1837), who 
defined psychology vulgar, because “the vulgarly received 
psychology runs thus, that in the rational soul there are two 
faculties, understanding and will, which understanding hath 
nothing of will in it, and will nothing of understanding in 
it. And to these two faculties are attributed the actions of 
intellection and volition; the understanding, say they, under-
standeth, and the will willeth.”
The third dates back to the beginning of the 18th century. 
The approach followed by John Broughton (1703), Chaplain 
of the Duke of Marlborough is different. In this case, the no-
tion of psychology is undoubtedly a positive one: it is the 
science of the soul, regarded as immaterial and immortal, 
united with the body for an adequate reason. However, more 
than half of the long text by Broughton is a harsh polemic 
directed against William Coward (who is never mentioned, 
by the way; Estibius Psychalethes, 1702), a sceptical thinker 
who anticipated a number of materialistic issues, and who 
argued that believing that a thinking principle could be add-
ed to matter, by postponing the problem of immortality after 
resurrection, was compatible with religion. Coward’s text 
aroused harsh criticism and was condemned to be burned by 
the House of Commons in 1704 – which made Coward re-
joice for the publicity given to his book, which he hastened 
to reprint. Locke (1824), too, from whom Coward claimed 
to have taken inspiration, spoke about the book with dis-
dain (although he used similarly contemptuous words for 
the Psychologia by Broughton8). 
With regard to medicine, one of the numerous texts 
known to have been published, mentioned because of the 
vast impact it had, is the Discourse by James (Jacob) de 
Back, then Professor of medicine at Rotterdam. It appeared 
in 1653 as an appendix to Harvey’s anatomical exercises. 
The text was in fact written in 1648, originally in Latin (see 
Lake, 1966). The text begins with a definition of anthro-
pology, which almost certainly takes Casmann into account 
(see above). To de Back, anthropology is the general science 
of man which can be divided into psychologia, somatologia, 
and haematologia, dealing respectively with soul, body, and 
blood. The soul is what gives impetus to every vital activity, 
the body puts pulse into this, and blood is the essential me-
dium for any function. Note that for de Back anthropology 
is a purely physical science, and should therefore be called 
physiological, and should also include the study of diseases. 
It should be observed that one of Harvey’s opponents, Jean 
Riolan Le Jeune, would also resume Casmann’s distinction 
of anthropology into psychology and somatology (Riolan, 
1618, p. 81).
The text is divided into three parts. The first one denies 
the doctrine of the vital spirits, then dominant in medicine. 
De Back claims that we should believe only those things 
that we can see with our eyes or that we can touch, and 
which are confirmed by reason. But if the spirits, as it was 
then believed, exist regardless of blood, and are made of 
substances such as air or mist-thin, who can ever be said 
to have seen them? Moreover, the examination of vessels 
shows that they contain only blood. The second part then 
deals with haematopoiesis, and the third with body heat. In 
fact, the problem of psychology does not appear again in the 
rest of the text.
 Wolff’s Psychologia empirica 
This is not the case in Wolff’s book (1732), which began 
with the following definition of this branch of knowledge: 
“Empirical psychology is the science that establishes the 
principles with the help of the experience through which 
one can explain everything that happens in the Soul”9 (p. 
1 – this is the beginning of the Prolegomena, of which we 
have a translation and commentary by Richards, 1980). Af-
ter that, to define what soul is and how man can acquire 
knowledge of it, he said: “You must look elsewhere than 
in ourselves for the proof of our existence, we feel that we 
think, that we have ideas of things that are out of us, that 
they exist or not exist...This principle that we perceive as 
thinking, that has ideas of things that are out of us, is called 
Soul or Spirit “(p. 2).
One may think that in this Wolff would fit Cartesianism 
(and Descartes, for that matter, is one of the authors, togeth-
8 In a letter of 9 July, 1703 to Anthony Collins, Locke wrote about 
Broughton’s book after reading its fifth paragraph “I think not to trou-
ble myself to look farther into him. He has there argued very weakly 
against his adversary, but very strongly against himself”. 
9 Psychologia empirica est scientia stabilendi principia per experien-
tiam, unde ratio redditur eorum, quæ in anima humana fiunt.
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er with Leibniz, whom he very frequently cited), however 
there are differences (see Blackwell, 1961; for a long series 
of references on Wolff, see Senn, 1997). First, he wrote: “we 
are conscious of us and of all the things that are around us 
and that we experience in each moment”10 (Wolff, 1732, 
p. 9). If, for Descartes, we cannot doubt our existence, for 
Wolff we cannot doubt not only this, but also everything 
that surrounds us. Among other things, for Wolff the subject 
is never “ego”, but “nos”: “We exist” (p. 11). But this is the 
conclusion of a syllogism, where the major premise states 
that “quodcunque ens sui ipsius aliarumque rerum extra se 
sibi actu conjunctum est, illud existit”, and the minor one, 
“Atqui, nos nostri aliarumque rerum extra nosactu nobis 
conscii sumus”. Ergo, we exist (p. 12). 
Interestingly, in a French description of Wolff’s ideas, 
which had a wide diffusion, and is in many parts almost 
a literal translation, Psychologia empirica has been trans-
lated as experimental psychology (Anonymous, 1756). And 
indeed, for Wolff, whose strong scientific background, es-
pecially in mathematics, should not be forgotten, and who 
was well aware of the successes that physics was experienc-
ing, especially with Newton, experimentation, side by side 
with observation, was the key to physics’ empirical system 
– but not for psychology. From this point of view, § 456 
ff. are of extreme importance: “Observatio est experientia, 
quæ versatur circa facta naturæ fine nostra opera contingen-
tia. Experimentum est experientia, quæ versatur circa facta 
naturæ, quæ nonnisi interveniente opera nostra contigunt 
[…] Ars inveniendi a posteriori veritatem incognitam eruit 
vel ex observationibus, vel ex experimentis” (Wolff, 1732, 
p. 357). Observation is typical of physicists and physicians, 
but above all of astronomers, and the experiment is typical 
of physicists, but also of all philosophy, including natural 
theology (p. 358). If this is the truth found a posteriori, then 
there is also a way to find it a priori, “for ratiocinia.” The 
“ars inveniendi a priori”, the ars inveniendi par excellence 
(§ 461), typical of mathematics, is linked with the art a pos-
teriori. As best demonstrated by astronomy, the most com-
plete knowledge can be achieved through this conjunction 
(p. 358). 
Now, empirical psychology is to experience the contents 
of consciousness, and the principles that govern them. Ra-
tional psychology is the science that determines the contents 
of the soul a priori. Together, and only together, both con-
stitute the complete science of man. In the above-mentioned 
syllogism, it is clear that the major premise comes from 
rational psychology, the minor from empirical psychology, 
and both are necessary for a real knowledge of the soul. It 
should also be noted that, for Wolff, empirical psychology 
draws its contents from experience, but does so by observ-
ing, not by experimenting, the lawfulness of which is not 
denied in this field (as Kant would do later), but it is not 
explicitly stated.
Conclusion
After Wolff, for a few decades other words were pre-
ferred to psychology, while the discipline retained its mean-
ing of science of the soul. In German-speaking countries, 
it was Seelenlehre (Krüger, 1756, till Beneke, 1850; after 
that the term was used mostly, alas!, in the anthroposophi-
cal field) or Seelenkunde (Moritz, 1782), with an emphasis 
on experimentation in the first case, and on observation in 
the second one (see Hatfield, 2002; Sinatra, 2005). It was 
science de l’âme (Bonnet, 1755, 1760; Godart, 1755) in 
French-speaking countries. 
However, after Wolff, with the takeoff of the scientific 
psychology of the 19th century, the soul has been seen by 
psychologists from three different perspectives: the first 
approach can be defined “eliminativist”, to use a relatively 
recent term. It consisted of trying to build the new science 
by simply getting rid of the concept of soul (“psychology 
without a soul”, according to Lange’s [1866] well known 
expression). Herbart (1816) or Lotze (1858), for example, 
according to the second perspective, tried to save the met-
aphysical sense of the soul, by reconciling and placing it 
side by side with scientific conceptions. The third perspec-
tive, for example that of Wundt (1863) or Lewes (1877), 
has maintained the concept of soul, defining it, however, in 
scientific terms.
However, the use of the term soul was banned from the 
psychological vocabulary at least since Angell’s famous 
ban, at the meeting of the American Psychological Associa-
tion in 1911, when the father of functionalism argued that 
“the term soul has generally been applied to the supposed 
spiritual essence of human personality which persists after 
death. As such, it is connected with problems not soluble 
by ordinary empirical methods. Psychology, as an empiri-
cal natural science, has consequently ceased to use it as a 
familiar part of its terminology” (Angell, 1911, p. 46). This 
ban has been carefully observed ever since.
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